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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Unlike each of the cases relied upon by Google, this is not a case where Google merely 
buried the plaintiff's websites on the last pages of its search results with an allegedly unfair 
"PageRank," refused to run the plaintiff’s advertisements due to the ads' content, or censored 
political information. This is a case where a Google employee admittedly targeted one small 
business and decided that all of that business's websites and paid advertisements would be 
completely hidden from all Google users' views, regardless of the websites' or the ads’ content. 
As a result of this action, when the public searched for e-ventures’ websites on Google, they 
could not be found.
Google's purported rationale for this decision was that e-ventures (like many companies) had 
attempted to cause its websites to be ranked higher in Google's search results and that this "bad 
behavior" needed to be "deterred." The parties dispute whether and to what extent "search 
engine manipulation" by e-ventures occurred. Google itself defines what it considers to be 
"search engine manipulation" or "pure spam," and adopts a definition that is vague, non-
exhaustive, and unpredictable. Under Google’s definition, any website owner that attempts to cause 
its website to rank higher, in any manner, could be guilty of "pure spam" and blocked from Google's 
search results, without explanation or redress. Because Google holds a 70-90% share of the search 
market, such a decision would be fatal to any small, online publishing business like e-ventures. 
Google's assurance that there are "plenty of alternatives" to Google is disingenuous; Google has 
a practical monopoly in the search market and its competitors are pseudo-competitors.
Google admits that its published "Removal Policies" do not acknowledge that Google 
engages in this conduct; instead, it points to the "Webmaster Guidelines" buried somewhere on 
its website. There has been no showing that the general public reads the "Webmaster Guidelines" 
or considers them to be anything other than "guidelines" for "webmasters" and not terms of use 
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2for the general public that override Google's published "Removal Policies." Even assuming that 
such a showing could be made by Google, none of the "Webmaster Guidelines" indicate that 
Google ever acts against a specific company or individual in a punitive manner as occurred here. 
Instead, the Guidelines portray Google's removals as strictly content-based, not company-based. 
In fact, Google's public relations team goes to great lengths to portray Google's search results as 
transparent, fair and comprehensive. At the same time, Google's legal team suggests that Google's 
individual employees wield the power to make any company or individual's websites disappear 
completely and covertly, for any reason (even, for example, because of a personal vendetta), and that 
there is no redress in courts of law. 
II. FACTS
A. e-ventures and Google have a long-standing, direct, commercial relationship.
1. As alleged in e-ventures' Complaint, Google was "manually excluding e-ventures' 
websites from appearing anywhere in Google search results," including both Google's paid and 
unpaid search listings. Doc. 1, Complaint ("Compl."), ¶ 1 (emphasis added). e-ventures' websites 
were previously displayed in both Google's paid and unpaid search results. Id. at ¶ 46.
2. e-ventures is a "consumer" as alleged in ¶ 51 of the Complaint, because e-ventures 
has paid Google to advertise e-ventures' websites in Google's search results for years. See attached 
Trika Verification
1
, ¶ 3. See also Doc. 11, Trika Verif., ¶ 8.
3. e-ventures’ monthly payments to Google were and are extremely significant and 
guaranteed premium placement of e-ventures' websites in Google's "paid" search results. Id. at ¶ 4.
                                                          
1
The Trika Verification provides additional factual detail relevant to Google's Motion. If the 
Court believes that e-ventures' Complaint should be amended to add these allegations, e-ventures 
respectfully requests leave to amend. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (Leave to amend “shall be freely 
given” by district courts “when justice so requires”); Thomason v. West Bank FSB, No. 13–
11987, 2014 WL 7139750, *3 (11
th
Cir. Dec. 16, 2014) (“Generally, where a more carefully 
drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the 
complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.")
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34. Like other advertisers participating in Google's "AdWords" program, e-ventures pays 
Google based on the number of times a user clicks on the ad to reach e-ventures' website. Id. at ¶ 5.
5. Google’s ad is a link to e-ventures' website that asks users to "click" on it. When a 
user clicks on the link, it triggers a commercial transaction between e-ventures and Google. Id.
6. Google's public statements indicate that over 95% of Google's over $50 billion in 
annual revenues are from advertisements like these. Compl., ¶ 19; Doc. 11, Ex. G to Arena Decl.
B. Google acknowledges that a Google employee (or employees) intentionally removed 
every website associated with e-ventures from both Google's paid and unpaid 
search listings shortly after receiving a third party complaint.
7. Plaintiff alleges, and Google does not appear to dispute, that a third party with a 
personal vendetta against e-ventures reported false information to Google about e-ventures' websites. 
Compl., ¶ 32. Google admits that its actions were triggered by "an external 'tip'" about e-ventures it 
received in mid-September. See Doc. 31, Google's Declaration of Brandon Falls ("Falls Decl."), ¶ 37. 
Google did not (and still has not) shared the tipster's message with e-ventures.
8. Google now claims that it "first noticed" e-ventures' websites and what Google 
alleges was e-ventures' "bad behavior" in 2005. Falls Decl., ¶ 28. To e-ventures' knowledge, Google 
never contacted e-ventures or did anything else about this in 2005. Google's conduct in mid-
September 2014 came without warning to e-ventures. Compl., ¶ 30-31. 
9. Google claims that 366
2
websites were removed on September 18, 2014 based upon 
the websites' perceived affiliation with e-ventures and "to efficiently use Google's resources."  See
Falls Decl., ¶ 39 ("I manually removed 366 of e-ventures' sites from Google's search results. Given 
the breadth and scope of violations (and Plaintiff's long history of search engine manipulation), we 
acted upon the entire network of websites to efficiently use Google's resources…"); Doc. 30, 
                                                          
2
Interestingly, e-ventures identified 244 websites that Google removed, and Google stated that it 
removed 366 websites it connected to e-ventures.  It is currently unclear who owns the remaining 
122 websites that were removed.
Case 2:14-cv-00646-JES-CM   Document 42   Filed 01/12/15   Page 7 of 28 PageID 303
4Google's Brief, at 6 ("Google decided to treat e-ventures' collection of websites as a single network. 
Such grouping allows Google to use its resources more efficiently…") (emphasis in quotes added).
10. Google's statements indicate that, for reasons of "efficiency," it did not individually 
review and analyze the content of each of the 366 websites prior to their removal. Id.
11. e-ventures’ websites were removed not just from Google's "natural" or "unpaid" 
search listings, but also from Google's paid search listings. Compl., ¶ 46.
12. In addition, e-ventures’ ads were not just removed from www.google.com. Google 
also delivers millions of ads on third party websites through its display network advertising program. 
When Google delisted e-ventures, upon information and belief, e-ventures ads were also removed 
from these third party websites. Trika Verif., ¶ 6.
13. On September 19, after e-ventures’ websites had been delisted, Google sent e-
ventures  notifications claiming that the 231 websites associated with e-ventures' Webmaster Tools 
account had been removed because Google had identified them as "pure spam."  Compl., ¶ 33. 
14. The delisted websites included "corporate" websites, new websites, and websites that 
could not have engaged in activities that could possibly be classified as "spam."  Id. at ¶ 34.
15. Following the removal, when an individual searched for "eventures" on Google's 
search engine, a confusing display of third party websites for companies using the trademark 
"eventures" appeared, but e-ventures' actual corporate websites were absent from Google's paid and 
unpaid search listings. Compl., ¶ 46. 
16. On September 23, e-ventures created new, completely inoffensive, "test" websites to 
see if they would be listed in Google's search results. See Doc. 11, e-ventures' Prelim. Inj. Motion, at 
3. As before, without any content-based justification, Google also removed those websites. Id.
17. e-ventures also created new paid ads for its websites to see if they would also be 
blocked by Google, but not all of them were blocked. Trika Verif., ¶ 7. 
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518. Accordingly, during the ban, Google accepted money from e-ventures to run a paid 
ad for a website that Google continued to block from its "natural" search listings as "spam." Id.
Google continued to take e-ventures' money to advertise websites that Google claimed had "run afoul 
of Google's quality standards" and required e-ventures to pay Google to have its websites listed in
Google's search results, although Google offers that privilege to most website owners for free. Id.
C. Google acknowledges that its decision was punitive and anti-competitive.
19. Google claims that its “mission” is to “organize the world’s information.”  Doc. 36, 
Google's Motion, at 3. At the same time, Google admits that it covertly punishes parties by excluding 
their information from “the world’s information.”  Motion, at 4-5.
20. Google admits that it takes "manual action" to punish parties that Google believes 
engage in bad behavior. See Falls Decl., ¶ 6 ("[W]e also may manually adjust or edit our search 
results (i.e. take 'manual action') when we believe it appropriate to deter bad behavior…"). 
21. Google defines "bad behavior" vaguely and non-exhaustively. See Doc. 26, Google's 
Brief, at 4 (Its "guidelines give specific examples of the kind of manipulations that may lead Google 
to take manual action against particular websites…But Google cautions that the specific violations 
described in the guidelines are not exhaustive."); Google's Motion, at 16, Ex. A at 3 ("Google may 
respond negatively to other misleading practices not listed here. It's not safe to assume that just 
because a specific deceptive technique isn't included on this page, Google approves of it.").
22. "Bad behavior" includes anything Google deems a "low quality" website (see, e.g., 
Doc. 31, ¶ 45), including websites with little or duplicate content or with poor grammar. 
23. "Search engine manipulation" includes anything done to a website to make it more 
visible on Google. Arguably, creating a website "title tag" or headline containing relevant terms, 
which almost every website owner does, constitutes "search engine manipulation."
24. Google does not dispute that delisting e-ventures’ websites also benefited Google 
economically and had an anti-competitive impact. Compl., ¶ 18. e-ventures' websites advertise 
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6companies that offer "search engine optimization services," or services aimed at causing companies' 
websites to be ranked higher in Google's search results. If companies adopt strategies that cause their 
websites to be ranked higher in Google’s unpaid search results, those companies have less of an 
incentive to buy Google’s advertising services. Id.
25. Google's removal of e-ventures’ websites (and affiliated Google advertisements) was 
not based upon the content of the websites or advertisements; rather, it was based on the websites' 
apparent affiliation with e-ventures and Google's stated objective of "punishment" of e-ventures for 
alleged “bad behavior.”  See Falls Decl., ¶ 6, 39; Doc. 30, Google's Brief, at 6.
26. Google also admits that it does not notify the public about websites manually 
removed as “spam.” See Falls Dec., ¶ 25. Google claims that notifying the public of its manual action 
would "reflect the proprietary signals that Google employs" (id.), but it is unclear, and Google makes 
no attempt to explain, how disclosing a list of the blocked websites would disclose Google's 
"proprietary signals."  
D. Google Intentionally Confuses its "Removal Policies" with its "Webmaster 
Guidelines."
27. In an apparently-intentional attempt to confuse two unrelated documents, Google has 
attached the "Webmaster Guidelines" and the "Removal Policies" together as Exhibit A to its 
Motion. Those two documents are viewed and accessed separately by Internet users at different 
website addresses and do not even link to one another. The Webmaster Guidelines comprise pages 1-
14 and the Removal Policies comprise pages 15-16 of Exhibit A.
28. Only the Removal Policies and Google's other published policies are referenced in 
Plaintiff's Complaint. The "Webmaster Guidelines" are not referenced in Plaintiff's Complaint.
29. An internet user looking for guidance on when websites are removed by Google is 
likely to view Google's “Removal Policies,” not the "Webmaster Guidelines." Compl., ¶¶ 21-29; see 
also Doc. 11, at 6-8. 
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730. Google's Removal Policies do not indicate that Google ever removes content as 
"spam" or "pure spam."  Id. Rather, they indicate that Google only removes websites containing 
harmful software, intellectual property violations, privacy violations or unlawful content pursuant to 
court order.
31. Discovery has yet to be taken as to Google’s published Policies, but some of 
Google’s policies contradict its actions towards e-ventures in this case. For example, Google cited 
the following policy in Kinderstart v. Google, No. 5:06cv0257 (N.D.Cal.):
It is Google's policy not to censor search results. However, in response to local laws, 
regulations, or policies, we may do so. When we remove search results for these reasons, 
we display a notice on our search results pages. Please note:  For some older removals 
(before March 2005), we may not show a notice at this time.
See Exhibit A, Google's Rule 11 Motion in Kinderstart v. Google, excerpted. In that Motion, Google 
vehemently argued that it never removes search results for political or religious reasons, undercutting 
Google's argument here that its search results should receive robust First Amendment protection. 
32. Even the "Webmaster Guidelines" cited by Google do not state that Google ever 
removes websites because they are affiliated with a particular party. Rather, those Guidelines allege 
that Google's removals are content-based and not company-based. 
E. Google's conduct caused significant economic damage to e-ventures. 
33. Google describes itself as "one of the world's leading Internet companies" (Motion, at 
3), but with 70-90% of the search market, Google has a practical monopoly and the power to destroy 
any small online publishing company (or even large publishing company) it chooses. Compl., ¶ 1.
34. Google's conduct caused significant damage to e-ventures. Third parties that 
contracted with e-ventures terminated those contracts when e-ventures' websites were delisted.
Compl., ¶ 44; Trika Verif., ¶ 9.
35. Third parties immediately noticed and had a clear interpretation of Google’s delisting 
of e-ventures' websites. For example, one blogger concluded in an article that: "Recently 
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8TopSEOs…was de-indexed by Google…for using black hat tactics. Its domain topseos.com was de-
indexed last week, and a second domain topseosglobal.com dropped within 24 hours of its creation. 
As of this writing, their third domain topseos-global.com has also been taken down from Google's 
index as well. … Google couldn't have killed TopSEOs from its search rankings any better than this."  
Doc. 11, Ex. D to Arena Decl.
36. Before filing its Complaint, e-ventures contacted Google repeatedly, prepared to 
make whatever changes to its websites that Google deemed necessary, but despite e-ventures’ best 
efforts, e-ventures could not even identify what changes Google wanted made to the websites. 
Compl., ¶ 38-41. e-ventures’ counsel also contacted Google, simply asking what e-ventures needed 
to do to get its websites relisted to avoid litigation, and could not get an answer. Id.
37. Following the filing of its Complaint, e-ventures continued to receive harassing 
emails from an anonymous Google email account, insinuating that the email’s sender was 
responsible for the delistings and asking e-ventures if it was “having fun yet.”  See Doc. 11, Ex. 1 to 
Trika Verif. e-ventures has not yet positively identified the emails’ sender and has not yet taken 
discovery.
38. Following e-ventures' preliminary injunction motion, Google gradually relisted e-
ventures' websites and advertisements. Trika Verif.,¶ 8. Although some of e-ventures' websites have 
changed to accommodate Google's ambiguous, unpredictable "preferences," not all of the websites 
changed before they were relisted. Google actually delisted and then relisted some websites without 
changes ever having been made to those websites, as if sua sponte, Google reconsidered its own 
actions. Id. at ¶ 11.
III. ARGUMENT
In considering this motion, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, Hishon 
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, (1984), and construe them in  plaintiff's favor. Duke v. Cleland, 
5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). To survive this motion, the complaint need not contain “detailed 
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9factual allegations,” but must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds 
upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). 
Dismissal of a complaint is appropriate only “when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no 
construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action.” Marshall County Bd. of 
Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). As the Eleventh Circuit 
has noted, "the threshold of sufficiency that a complaint must meet to survive a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim is exceedingly low."  In re Southeast Banking Corp., 69 F.3d 1539, 1551 (11th 
Cir.1995) (quotations omitted). If dismissal could be avoided through amendment of the complaint, 
leave to amend the complaint should be freely given. Thomason v. West Bank FSB, No. 13–11987, 
2014 WL 7139750, *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 16, 2014).
A. The First Amendment Does Not Give Google Unchecked Power.
Ironically, Google's defense to silencing e-ventures by causing all of its websites  to "disappear," 
without those websites even being individually reviewed by Google, is the First Amendment. Google 
argues that it can punish any party it chooses through its search results, for any reason, and the victim 
has no legal recourse.
In arguing for blanket First Amendment immunity, Google asserts that it was merely acting like a 
newspaper publisher "expressing its constitutionally protected opinion about what information would 
be relevant to its users’ queries."  Motion, at 10. This does not jibe with Google’s other explanation, 
which was that Google delisted e-ventures’ websites’ to “deter” e-ventures’ perceived “bad 
behavior.”  If relevance was truly the concern, then Google obviously could have merely listed e-
ventures’ websites on the last pages of its search results (where less relevant results are typically 
found), but Google decided to preclude e-ventures’ websites and ads from being displayed even on 
pages that most users never reach.
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Instead of being analogous to a newspaper that declines to run an article because of that article's 
content, for its readers' benefit, Google's actions are more analogous to a publisher that summarily 
decides that one of its longstanding advertisers is engaging in "bad behavior,” which has been 
decreasing the publisher’s revenues. To deter this "bad behavior," the publisher decides that the 
advertiser and all of its perceived affiliates are being blacklisted from 70-90% of the town's 
publications for an undetermined amount of time, until the publisher is sufficiently convinced that the 
advertiser has reformed, at which point, the blacklist will end and the ads will run again. Meanwhile, 
the publisher’s true motivation is anti-competitive. The publisher only informs the advertiser of the 
blacklist after the blacklist has already begun, and after the public has already wrongfully concluded 
that the advertiser was engaged in "bad behavior."  Then the advertiser files suit against the 
publisher, the blacklist ends, and some of the "blacklisted" content begins running again.
Google's actions were not based on editorial judgments. First, if Google's removals were based 
on editorial judgments, then Google would have actually reviewed e-ventures' websites before taking 
action, but Google admitted that it did not even do so. See Statement of Facts above "SMF," at ¶ 9-
10. Second, Google would not have delisted and then relisted some websites without any changes 
being made to those websites. Id. at ¶ 39. Third, Google would not have continued to accept payment 
to display websites that were purportedly being "blocked" as "spam" or violated Google's quality 
standards. Id. at ¶ 17. Fourth, Google would have addressed relevance by ranking e-ventures' 
websites lower, not blocking them entirely. Google's proffered explanation for its conduct – that 
Google was merely concerned about relevance - is false. The content of e-ventures' websites was not 
the cause of the action taken by Google, and accordingly, Google cannot assert a content-based First 
Amendment defense.   
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1. Whether Google's "Delisting" of All of a Party's Ads and Websites is Protected By 
the First Amendment is an Issue of First Impression.
None of the four cases cited by Google involve a party whose websites were precluded from 
being displayed in a search engine's paid or unpaid search results, regardless of the websites' content. 
None of these cases involve a FDUTPA claim, or an unfair trade practices claim based upon similar 
facts, or a defamation or tortious interference claim based upon similar facts. None of the cases 
involve Google's definition of "spam."  Each case is summarized below:
 Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F.Supp.3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). This anti-censorship 
lawsuit against a comparatively small, Chinese search engine involved the search 
engine's filtering out of certain political information related to the pro-democracy 
movement in China. Similar to how employers or parents may filter out certain 
material that is obscene, or related to topics like gambling or weapons, Baidu.com 
adopted algorithms that filtered out certain political information, regardless of the 
website on which it was displayed. The Court held that this conduct was protected by 
the First Amendment, considering that it was: (1) politically-motivated; (2) content-
based; (3) accomplished through search engine algorithms (not manual action); (4) not 
accomplished by a search engine with a monopoly (the Court specifically noted that 
Baidu.com was a relatively small search engine that blocked results which were still 
"widely available" through search engines such as Google, id. at *7); and (5) the 
speech was not commercial. Id. at *8. Unlike in Baidu, here: (1) Google's removals 
were not politically-motivated, instead, the removals were for commercial, anti-
competitive reasons; (2) Google's removals were not content-based, they were 
company-based – Google did not even review all of e-ventures' websites before 
removing them; (3) Google's removals were not accomplished through algorithms, but 
rather were the result of an employee's manual action; (4) unlike Baidu.com, Google 
has monopoly power; and (5) if the manual action was "speech," it was "commercial 
speech" that included the removal of paid ads.
 Langdon v. Google, No. 06cv319, 2007 WL 530156 (D.Del. Feb. 20, 2007). Langdon's 
pro se complaint was convoluted, but appeared to assert that "Google disproved his 
ads on the basis of unacceptable content." Id. at *2. Google rejected the ads because 
they contained attacks against an individual or protected group, including attacks 
against named individuals. Id. Langdon's websites were not delisted. Langdon did not 
submit any written defense to Google's motion to dismiss on First Amendment 
grounds. Id. at *5. The court summarily concluded that Google was able to decline to 
run Plaintiff's advertisements based upon the ads' objectionable content under the First 
Amendment. Unlike Langdon, this case does not concern Google's rejection of 
objectionable ad content. In fact, the content of e-ventures' ads remained the same 
before and after the Google ban. This case concerns a complete removal of 366 
websites (as well as the ads) from Google's paid and unpaid search listings, based upon 
their apparent affiliation with e-ventures. 
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 Kinderstart v. Google, No. 06cv2057, 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
Kinderstart alleged that Google gave its websites an unfairly-low ranking or 
"PageRank."  Unlike in this case, Kinderstart did not allegedly pay Google to run ads 
that were delisted. Kinderstart’s defamation claim against Google was dismissed due 
to California's common interest privilege. Id. at *20. However, in its final opinion, the 
Court noted that, if the defamation claim had not been barred by the common interest 
privilege, the defect in the defamation claim "conceivably could be cured by 
amendment."  Id. at *19. Unlike in Kinderstart, Google did not simply misrank e-
ventures' websites. Aside from the court’s apparent recognition of the potential 
viability of a defamation claim under these circumstances, Kinderstart is of limited 
relevance because the claims, the Google conduct, and the Google policies at issue 
were all different.
 Search King v. Google, No. 02cv1457, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 
2003). Search King also contended that Google was liable for assigning its websites 
an unfairly low PageRank in Google's unpaid search listings. The case did not involve 
paid ads or a discussion of commercial speech, and Search King only asserted one 
claim - intentional interference with contractual relations. The Court concluded that 
"there is no conceivable way to prove that the relative significance assigned to a 
given web site [or its PageRank] is false" (id. at *4), and dismissed the claim on that 
basis. Unlike Search King, this matter involves a delisting of paid ads and websites. The 
Search King court could not conceive of how to gauge whether the relevance of a website 
was a false statement, but here, the court is not required to gauge the relevance of e-
ventures' websites. 
In sum, there is no case where a court has examined similar conduct by Google and 
concluded that it was speech protected by the First Amendment. Even if we interpret Search King, 
Baidu, and Langdon to hold that the PageRank Google assigns to its unpaid search listings is 
"speech," that does not mean that Google's actions in blocking a certain company from being 
displayed on any Internet property that Google controls (both paid and unpaid) is "speech."    
2. Google's Conduct Was Not Speech Because It Was Not Content-Based – It 
Was Company-Based, Punitive, and Anti-Competitive.
To further its arguments in cases like these, Google previously commissioned a White Paper, 
which concludes that search engines' immunity is virtually limitless – see Eugene Volokh & Donald 
M. Falk, Google First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, 24 Geo. Mason U. 
C.R.L.J. 89 (2013). Interestingly, even in the White Paper Google commissioned, the authors note that 
the First Amendment only protects Google to the extent its decisions are motivated by content:
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To be sure, it is constitutionally permissible to stop a newspaper from 'forcing advertisers to 
boycott a competing' media outlet, when the newspaper refuses advertisements from 
advertisers who deal with the competitor. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 
152, 155 (1951). But the newspaper in Lorain Journal Co. was not excluding advertisements 
because of their content, in the exercise of some editorial judgment that its own editorial 
content was better than the proposed advertisements. Rather, it was excluding advertisements 
solely because the advertisers—whatever the content of their ads—were also advertising on a 
competing radio station.
Volokh & Falk, supra, at 22. See also Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 155:
The publisher claims a right as a private business concern to select its customers and to refuse 
to accept advertisement from whomever it pleases. We do not dispute that general right. But 
the word 'right' is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a qualified 
meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are qualified.
As in Lorain Journal Co., Google did not block e-ventures' websites and advertisements because 
of their content. In fact, Google assures the public that it never removes websites for political, 
religious, or similar content-based reasons. Ex. A. Google blacklisted e-ventures for punitive, anti-
competitive reasons, and removed e-ventures' websites and ads as part of that effort. Google did not 
even review all of the websites before removing them, Google continued to run paid ads for some of 
the same (allegedly harmful) content, and some content remained the same before and after the 
websites and ads were delisted. SMF, ¶ 9, 18, 39. In defining "spam" as - whatever Google wants to 
define "spam" as, Google is attempting to write itself a blank check that allows Google to punitively 
damage any party it chooses, for whatever reason. Id. at ¶ 21-23. But having taken action against the 
company, not the content, Google cannot credibly argue that it was just looking out for "relevance" 
for the benefit of its users. 
3. If Google's Conduct Was Speech, Then It Was Commercial Speech Entitled to 
Lesser First Amendment Protection.
Certain categories of speech receive a lesser degree of constitutional protection under the First 
Amendment. See Snyder v. Phelps, -- U.S. --, 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2001); Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, 
Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 515 (7
th
Cir. 2014) (analyzing First Amendment defense to unfair trade practices 
claim in dispute between private parties). "Commercial speech was initially viewed as being outside 
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the ambit of the First Amendment altogether," but now receives some lesser level of protection. 
Jordan,743 F.3d at 515. The "hallmark of commercial speech" is that it "pertains to commercial 
transactions."  Id. at 516-17. However, "the commercial-speech category is not limited to speech that 
directly or indirectly proposes a commercial transaction."  Id. Courts have also considered whether 
"(1) the speech is an advertisement; (2) the speech refers to a specific product; and (3) the speaker 
has an economic motivation for the speech."  Id. If the speech is commercial, the First Amendment 
does not provide a complete defense and Plaintiff's claims should not be dismissed. Id. at 522.
In the Baidu decision relied upon by Google, the court concluded that the definition of 
commercial speech "would presumably apply to advertisements displayed by a search engine, and 
might even apply to 'search results shown to purposefully advance an internal commercial interest of 
the search provider.'"  Baidu, 2014 WL 1283730, at *8. 
The e-ventures ads that Google delisted clearly meet this definition. The ads consisted of 
sponsored links that invited the consumer to click on them, and with each click, Google received 
compensation. Google cannot deny that these ads proposed a commercial transaction, and 
accordingly, if the ads were to constitute "speech," that speech would be "commercial" and entitled 
to lesser First Amendment protection. Under these circumstances, as in Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, 
dismissal is not justified.
B. The Communications Decency Act does not protect Google because Google did not act 
in "good faith" and did not even look at the websites' content, much less make a "good 
faith" determination that the content was sufficiently objectionable.
As acknowledged by Google, the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230 (“CDA”), 
protects internet service providers from liability only where they acted in "good faith."  47 U.S.C. § 
230(c)(2). Google further admits that, at this preliminary stage, the issue is whether Plaintiff has pled 
an absence of good faith. Motion, at 12. See also Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards, No. 
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09cv4567, 2010 WL 1799456, *7 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010) (court could not conclude that internet 
service providers exercised "good faith" at dismissal stage).
Plaintiff has pled an absence of good faith, alleging that Google's conduct was commercial, 
punitive, anti-competitive, and went well beyond a "traditional publisher's function."  Specifically, 
Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that Google did not act in accordance with its own published 
Removal Policies (SMF, ¶ 27-32), that Google provided e-ventures with no notice before summarily 
delisting the websites (id. at ¶ 7-8), that Google did not provide e-ventures with reasonable redress 
(even after e-ventures contacted Google through counsel and initiated this lawsuit) (id. at ¶ 36), and 
that Google's actions appear to have been precipitated by an anonymous tipster (id. at ¶ 7). Without 
the benefit of discovery, e-ventures does not actually know the identity of the tipster or his 
relationship with Google. Even if the individual is unknown to Google, it does suggest bad faith that 
Google would take such destructive, arbitrary action based upon the ranting of an anonymous tipster, 
without even providing e-ventures with an opportunity to rebut the tipster's accusations. 
Google either ignores Plaintiff's allegations of bad faith or argues that they are not "plausible."  
Google's Motion, at 13. As the Court is undoubtedly aware, the Court is required to accept Plaintiff's 
factual allegations and all reasonable inferences from them as true for the purposes of this Motion. 
Moreover, most of the allegations cited above have either been admitted or ignored by Google. See 
Smith, 2010 WL 1799456, at *7 ("One would expect that if an interactive computer service had acted 
in good faith, it could and would have come forward with the legitimate basis for its actions when 
questioned"). Google's arguments amount to an admission that e-ventures' claims are not ripe for 
dismissal under the CDA. 
In addition, even assuming that Google could meet the "good faith" standard, which it cannot, 
Google still cannot show it believed the information was "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable."  See §230(c)(2). First, there is no case 
cited by Google indicating that "search engine manipulation" is "otherwise objectionable" under the 
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statute. The statute was designed to "empower parents to restrict their children's access to 
objectionable or inappropriate online material."  See Smith, 2010 WL 179945, at *6. The cases 
Google cites involving harassing, offensive email spam (which could be sent to email accounts 
viewed by children or other members of the public) are clearly inapposite. e-ventures' websites were 
not objectionable and harmed no member of the public. Second, Google forgets that it did not even 
review all of e-ventures' websites and ads before summarily removing them, and then relisted some 
of the same content that had earlier been delisted. Clearly, the content of the websites and ads were 
not the issue. Google is not entitled to Section 230 immunity for content Google did not even review. 
Finally, Section 230 immunity does not exist for a FDUTPA claim, given that Section 230 states 
that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law 
that is consistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). See also Almedia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
456 F.3d 1316 (11
th
Cir. 2006) (discussing limits to Section 230 immunity).
C. Plaintiff states a FDUTPA claim.
e-ventures is surprised to see that Google is asserting that "Plaintiff was not a consumer of 
Google's services" (Motion, at 15) as Google has received significant monthly payments from e-
ventures to advertise e-ventures’ websites (the same websites that were delisted) for years. SMF, ¶ 2-
3. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts that its websites were removed from Google's "paid" search listings, 
which they only inhabit by virtue of payment to Google. Compl., ¶ 1, 46; Trika Verif. Plaintiff was 
and is a consumer of Google's services. Id.
Google also confuses the standards between a FDUTPA claim surviving a motion to dismiss and 
succeeding at trial in arguing that the "plaintiff must make 'a showing of probable, not possible, 
deception.'"  Doc. 36, Motion, at 16. At this stage, Plaintiff is not required to make an evidentiary 
showing; Plaintiff's factual allegations are accepted as true and are more than sufficient to state a 
FDUTPA claim. 
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In addition, although Google accuses e-ventures of having a "lack of candor" because e-ventures 
did not reference and attach Google's "Webmaster Guidelines" in the Complaint, Google improperly 
attaches completely separate documents (Google's Webmaster Guidelines and Removal Policies) as 
one Exhibit to its Motion, apparently in an attempt to confuse the Court into considering the
documents together. SMF, ¶ 27-32. These documents are accessed by e-ventures and the public at 
separate website addresses. Id. The documents do not even link to one another. Id. Google also refers 
to the "Webmaster Guidelines" as part of Google's "Policies" although the Guidelines are never 
identified as "Policies" and are not listed with Google's published Policies. Id. e-ventures submits 
that the Webmaster Guidelines, which were not even referenced in Plaintiff's Complaint, should not 
be considered by the Court on a motion to dismiss.
Nevertheless, even if the Webmaster Guidelines are considered, they do not mean that Google's 
conduct was not "unfair" or "deceptive."  First, the Guidelines never indicate that Google will punish 
a person or company by removing all of their websites, without individual review, to "deter" "bad 
behavior,” but that is what Google alleges occurred here. Google’s actions were inconsistent with 
even the Guidelines. If Google's conduct had comported with its statements to the public, Policies,
and Guidelines, then e-ventures' websites and ads would not have been delisted. 
Second, it is not enough for Google to point to statements that exist in obscure locations on the 
web and argue that, as a result, its policies are transparent. Rather, Google must show that the public 
actually reads the Guidelines and understands them to be terms of use, even where they contradict 
Google's other published policies. Moreover, there is nothing transparent about Guidelines that 
provide vague, non-exhaustive definitions of terms like "pure spam," which are terms coined by and 
defined by Google.
Third, Google’s actions were “unfair” within the meaning of the statute because they were anti-
competitive. Google’s criticism of e-ventures was that e-ventures tried to be ranked higher in 
Google’s search results. Hypocritically, Google accepts monthly payments from e-ventures to 
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achieve the same result. e-ventures’ pays Google significant sums each month to be listed first in 
Google’s paid link advertisements. Google’s true criticism of e-ventures was that e-ventures was 
decreasing Google’s revenues from the paid links. 
Fourth, despite Google's assertions that its statements are not deceptive, they are contrary to 
Google's conduct here. For example:
 Google's "mission is 'to organize the world's information.'" Motion, at 3. Google excluded e-
ventures' information from the world's information.
 "Google's index merely reflects that the page exists on the wider web"  Compl., ¶ 22. e-
ventures' pages existed on the web, but they were not reflected in Google's index.
 "Google search results are a reflection of the content publicly available on the web." Id. ¶ 
23. e-ventures' websites were publicly available but did not appear in Google search results.
 "See our Removal Policies to learn more about what information Google will remove."  Id. ¶ 
24. The Removal Policies say nothing about the removal of "spam" or blacklisting 
companies.
 "This page explains our policies for different types of content that Google will remove from 
web, image or video results."  Id. at ¶ 25. Again, spam and blacklisting is not mentioned.
 "Google is committed to leading the industry in transparency" and publishes data that "sheds 
light on how laws and policies affect Internet users and the flow of information online."  Id. 
at ¶ 27. Google does not publish any data shedding light on these removals.
 "Chilling Effects posts and analyzes copyright removal requests (among other types of 
content removal requests) from a number of participating companies on its website. We link 
in our search results to the requests published by Chilling Effects in place of removed content 
when we are able to do so legally." Id. at 28. Google could have linked to Chilling Effects
legally, but did not do so, to let the public know that e-ventures' websites had been removed.
 "It is Google's policy not to censor search results. However, in response to local laws, 
regulations, or policies, we may do so. When we remove search results for these reasons, we 
display a notice on our search results pages. Please note:  For some older removals (before 
March 2005), we may not show a notice at this time."  SMF, ¶ 31. Google censored e-
ventures' websites without any notice to the public.
Finally, Google cannot succeed in arguing that its actions were aimed at preventing injury to the 
consuming public, while also arguing that Google's goal was "deterring" "bad behavior." The public
was not Google's concern, because: (a) Google continued to profit from e-ventures' websites (which 
Google alleged were engaging in "bad behavior") during the Google ban (id. at ¶ 18); (b) Google 
delisted websites that were not engaged in "deceptive manipulations" (id. at ¶ 14, 16); (c) Google 
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eventually restored Plaintiff’s websites and ads, sometimes with no changes having been made (id. at 
¶ 39); and (d) Google delisted the websites instead of just impacting their "relevancy."
D. Plaintiff states a defamation claim.
Google’s arguments are contradictory. On the one hand, Google argues that it cannot be liable 
under FDUTPA or in tort because its search results are published "speech" protected by the First 
Amendment, and websites are manually removed by Google only if they meet Google's narrow 
criteria for removal. On the other hand, Google argues that in manually removing e-ventures' 
websites, because they did meet Google's narrow criteria for removal, Google did not make any false 
statements about the websites. Google cannot have it both ways.
To understand the false message Google gave to the public about e-ventures, the Court need only 
look to commentators' statements about Google's action, such as "[e]ventures…was de-indexed by 
Google…for using black hat tactics."  Doc. 11, Arena Decl., Ex. D. Google's conduct informed the 
public, falsely, that the delisted websites engaged in "black hat tactics."  Whether or not e-ventures' 
websites did employ certain tactics or contain certain content, in violation of Google's published 
policies, is a question of fact. Contrary to Google's suggestion, no court has held that Google's 
delisting of a company's websites is an expression of an "opinion."  In Search King, 2003 WL 
21464568, at *10-12, the court said that Google's "PageRank," or the relevance assigned to a 
particular search result, was “opinion-like.”  That comment has no bearing on the question whether 
indicating to the public that e-ventures' websites were removed for "black hat tactics" is a false 
statement. See also Jews for Jesus v. Rapp, 997 So.2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008) ("Defamation by 
implication arises, not from what is stated, but from what is implied when a defendant 'juxtaposes a 
series of facts so as to imply a defamatory connection between them, or (2) creates a defamatory 
implication by omitting facts, [such that] he may be held responsible for the defamatory 
implication…'") (quoting Stevens v. Iowa Newspapers, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 823, 827 (2007)). The 
public could only interpret the disappearance of e-ventures from Google one way, and that 
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implication was defamatory. Moreover, Google's actions were at least negligent, as it acted without 
even reviewing all of the websites in question, for reasons of "efficiency."  SMF, ¶ 9-10.
Finally, Google quotes Plaintiff's Complaint in a misleading manner. The Complaint states: 
"Google's removal of over 230 websites of e-ventures falsely indicates to the public that e-ventures 
websites are not worthy of being listed on Google's search engine, because the websites somehow 
meet Google's narrow criteria for removal."  Compl., ¶ 63 (emphasis added). Google argues that the 
first portion of the quote is an expression of opinion. As discussed above, the second portion of the 
quote, which Google fails to address, is a question of fact.
E. Plaintiff states a tortious interference claim.
Google argues that the tortious interference claim should be dismissed under Florida's "single 
publication/single action rule."  This theory would require the Court to disregard that there are 
multiple publications at issue in this case – Google acted to delist e-ventures' websites not just on 
September 18, but also later when e-ventures' created new websites. Google's actions were varied and 
continuing between September 18 and December 11 (when e-ventures' websites were relisted and its 
preliminary injunction motion withdrawn). Google's theory would also require the Court to conclude 
that all of e-ventures' damages arose out of a single publication instead of multiple acts of delisting. 
The single-action rule cannot bar e-ventures' claim.
Google's argument that it acted with no knowledge of e-ventures' contractual relationships and 
did not cause them to be breached ignores reality. e-ventures' counsel sent Google's attorneys a letter 
detailing the damage, which was ignored, and e-ventures submitted multiple notices directly to 
Google, which were ignored, prior to filing its Complaint. Compl., ¶ 38-41.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny Google’s motion to 




Dated:  January 12, 2015
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